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Abstract  
It is argued that civil society organizations (CSOs) are crucial for ensuring good governance in any society. They 
can also contribute towards enabling accountable and transparent government and thereby enhancing employment 
opportunities and solve societal problems in any given country. Nevertheless, in Ethiopia the relationship between 
CSOs and Government is rather dubious and filled with mistrust. So it is found out via empirical investigation. 
The CSO law has been accused of over regulating and of hindrance to charities and societies operating in Ethiopia. 
The law, some contend, is framed with ill motive of controlling and subjugating. Nevertheless, the law is also 
argued for and that it put some sense to wild wishes and whims of CSOs (ulterior motives and criminal intents). 
This research is set out to examine and analyze the Charities and Societies Proclamation of Ethiopia.   
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1. Introduction  
The second half the 20th century witnessed a proliferation of civil society organizations (CSOs) in the global South. 
The increase in the number CSOs has been explained in terms of humanitarian crises, a perceived turbulence in 
world politics, the volatility of culturally plural societies, the acceleration of globalization and the failure of states 
to provide for their citizens and govern with legitimacy (Fisher, 1997). CSOs have been engaged in humanitarian 
assistance, service delivery, development projects, human rights and policy advocacy and environmental 
protection. They have been playing the role of the ‘the third sector’ in society, alongside government and business. 
It is equally important to note that CSOs in many countries have been operating under restrictive regulatory 
frameworks. Kendra Dupuy and her associates (2015) noted that 86 of 195 countries in the world have passed 
more restrictive CSO laws since 1955, most of which appeared between 1995 and 2012.  
The relationship between governments and civil society, especially in Africa, is mostly characterized by 
conflict. Indeed, the relationship of civil society with government is partly depends on the nature of services they 
provided to the society. Thus, civil society which engaged in welfare provision and humanitarian relief are the 
least likely to experience conflict with government. They are usually welcomed by the government since they 
reduce the burden of the government to provide welfare to the citizens (Sandberg, 2013). On the other hand, civil 
societies which experience hostility from the governments are those who engaged in advocacy works like 
promotion of human rights and democracy. These types of civil societies are commonly considered as opponents 
of government policies and structures. And the government is most likely attempt to control and monitor their 
activities in any means possible (Cakmak, 2004). The 2009 Ethiopian Charities and Societies Proclamation is part 
of these contentions. 
The proclamation regulates non-governmental organizations, mass membership based societies, charitable 
trusts and foundations. It has established the Charities and Societies Agency (CSA) with the objective to “enable 
and encourage charities and societies to develop and achieve their purposes in accordance to the law and to create 
a situation in which their operation is transparent and accountable” (FDRE, Proclamation No 621/2009, Article 5 
(1&2)). This objective is appreciated because it fulfills the legal vacuum existing in the previous law. 
But, the proclamation could be highly criticized as it places excessive restrictions on the work of civil societies 
engaged in good governance, human rights and democracy. According to Amnesty International (2012), this 
restriction imposed on civil society working on human rights, democracy and good governance in turn lead to the 
weakness of civil society which brings the weakness of democratization process in Ethiopia. With this in mind, 
the paper is aimed at examining and analyzing the Charities and Societies Proclamation of Ethiopia laying a 
particular emphasis on its conceptualization, funding and operational restrictions and challenges, as well as 
providing a policy options to be considered.  
 
2. CSOs in Ethiopia: General Background  
Long before the arrival of modern CSOs in Ethiopia, there were community-based traditional structures such as 
Edir (traditional funeral association), Equb (traditional credit association), and other self-help associations 
including those referred to in local vernaculars as mahiber, debbo, seddaka, etc. (Teshome, 2009). Although they 
have had undeniable local relevance, the ability of these informal associations to contribute to broader societal 
objectives and articulate public demands has not been clear (Rahmato, 2002). There were also faith-based 
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organizations in some parts of the country already in the 1930s. While formal NGOs such as the Red Cross started 
operating in the 1950s, the famine of the 1970s and the inability of the state to handle the situation led to the 
emergence of more relief and development NGOs (Consortium of Christian Relief and Development Association 
[CCRDA], 2009). 
Under the Derg regime, which was as intolerant to independent voices as its Imperial predecessor, some relief 
and development NGOs continued to exist especially after the famine that hit the northern part of the country again 
in the mid-1980s (CSA, 2010). Trade unions and co-operatives were also in existence but as instruments of state 
policy or in close connection to the political state apparatus. The downfall of the Derg in 1991 and the transition 
to a relatively more pluralistic political system led to the creation of more CSOs, including NGOs, professional 
associations, chambers of commerce, and a handful of advocacy organizations. The number of local NGOs 
increased dramatically from the very small number of church-based and other organizations by the end of the 
1980s to about 246 NGOs registered with the responsible organ of the Federal Government in the year 2000 
(Rahmato, 2002). However, most of the CSOs focused on service delivery and development projects and very few 
of them were engaged in policy advocacy on issues such as human rights and governance (Berhanu, 2002). This 
has been ascribed mainly to the hostility of the government to those who get involved in such work (Rahmato, 
2002). 
The two decades from 1991 to 2009 are known as a period when a remarkable progress in the numbers and 
activities of CSOs was seen in the history of the country. A relatively enabling atmosphere and significant 
contributions by these CSOs (they later renamed as Charities and Societies Organizations) to various programs 
that the country was desperately embarked on gave boost to the birth of hundreds of Charities and Societies 
Organizations (Addis Standard, 2012). Alarmed by the activities of some Charities and Societies Organizations 
that the Ethiopian government has claimed were involved in political activities, the government has adopted a new 
Proclamation No. 621/2009 in 2009. Alas, it became one of the numbers of controversial proclamations the country 
has enacted since the current regime came into power in 1991.  
 
3. Research Methodology  
The paper utilized a qualitative research approach since it enables a cross-examination of facts. Thus, general 
literature and various empirical studies conducted on associated issues were reviewed and examined. In addition, 
policy documents and existing legal frameworks particularly the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation and 
subsequent directives issued to implement the Proclamation were carefully scrutinized. Furthermore, to objectively 
understand the impact of the Proclamation on Charities and Societies operating in the country, numerical data was 
collected from the Charities and Societies Agency i.e. an institution established to register and regulate Charities 
and Societies operating in the country.    
 
4. Policy Initiation and Endorsement Process  
Recent studies revealed the enactment of restrictive laws in many countries seriously shrank the operating 
environment for CSOs (Dupuy et al., 2015; CIVICUS, 2015). The space for civil society engagement has been 
shrinking in nondemocratic states and established democracies (Unmuessig, 2015). In the non-west, authorities 
associated civic activism with neo-liberal inspiration and opted for heavy-handed responses, while western 
democratic nations suspended civil liberties or reduced the space for civic life due to fear of terrorism and in the 
name of security. In Ethiopia, combinations of factors (namely, accountability deficit of CSOs and the 
unprecedented civic activism during the period leading to the 2005 contested election) seem to have led to 
promulgation of the controversial Proclamation No. 621/2009.  
The CSP was drafted by government experts within the Ministry of Justice of Ethiopia. The draft containing 
provisions on the classification of CSOs into charities and societies, the rules of their formation, registration, and 
operation and the monitoring powers of the CSA passed through some stages of discussion and revision. The 
process was criticized for allowing very limited consultation with CSOs and legal professionals as the former were 
reportedly given only a short time to submit written comments (Dagne, 2008). Some improvements were made to 
the original draft of the law along the way, including the exclusion of religious organizations from its scope of 
application, the inclusion of two CSO representatives in then Board of the CSA, and the exclusion of the provisions 
that allow the Agency’s representatives to participate in the meetings of CSOs (Human Rights Watch, 2009). 
However, some highly contested provisions remained in the Proclamation as it’s finally endorsed by Ethiopian 
House of Peoples’ Representatives.  
 
5. The Proclamation and Its Restrictive Elements 
The Proclamation was enacted to “enable and encourage charities and societies to develop and achieve their 
purposes in accordance to the law and to create a situation in which their operation is transparent and accountable” 
(FDRE, Proclamation No. 621/2009, Article 5 (1 &2)). This objective of the Proclamation is both important and 
useful because before the enactment of the law there were transparency and accountability deficits on the part of 
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CSOs operating throughout the country. Moreover, the Proclamation also fulfills the legal vacuum existing in the 
previous law.   
The Proclamation governs two types of CSOs, namely, charities, which it defines as institutions established 
exclusively for charitable purposes and provide public benefits, and societies, which are voluntary, non-profit 
associations organized to promote the rights and interests of their members and to undertake other similar purposes 
(Articles 14(1) and 55(1)). The law mandates the CSA to register and regulate three categories of CSOs: Ethiopian 
Charities or Societies, Ethiopian Residents Charities or Societies and Foreign Charities (Article 2:2-4). The 
classification is based on the law under which they are formed, the nationality of their members, and the source of 
their funds. Let’s briefly examine them: 
 
a) Ethiopian Charities or Societies 
Ethiopian charities or Ethiopian societies are those CSOs that are formed by Ethiopians under the Ethiopian laws 
and that can engage in any activity, including human rights and policy advocacy (Article 2:2). However, they are 
not allowed to receive more than 10% of their funds from foreign sources. This 10% ceiling came to be known as 
the 90:10 rule  and it became the most controversial issue. Proponents of this provision argue that it reduce the 
vulnerability of sensitive domestic issues to manipulation by imported agendas that may accompany foreign funds. 
On the other hand, critics viewed the 10% ceiling as a strategy to silence the rights organizations and 
undermine their influence in society by starving them of funds (Yalemzewd et al., 2009; Debebe, 2010; Dupuy et 
al., 2015). Empirical studies undertaken on the issue stipulates that the 90:10 rule has eroded the capacity of CSOs 
to attain their goals. Some CSOs are reported to have changed their commitment to service delivery and 
development while others terminated their operations. 
In a country where close to 80% of the population lives on less than two dollars a day (United Nations 
Development Programme, 2010) and the culture of voluntarism is not deeply rooted, it is hard to imagine CSOs 
being able to raise 90% of what is needed for significant work on the various issues of human rights, democracy, 
the rule of law, and conflict resolution. Ironically, the government of the country itself derives about a quarter to 
one-third of its budget from foreign aid (FDRE Ministry of Finance and Economic Development, 2010). While 
recognizing the law challenges CSOs to look inwards for self-reliant and self-sustained financing, it looks almost 
practically impossible to locally raise 90% of what they need for their work, at least in the immediate and the 
intermediate term given the state of the economy of the county.  
 
b) Ethiopian Residents Charities or Societies 
Ethiopian resident charities or Ethiopian resident societies are CSOs that are formed by the residents of Ethiopia 
under the Ethiopian laws and they can receive up to 90% of their funds from foreign sources (Article 2:3). However, 
they are not allowed to engage in specific activities, namely, the advancement of human and democratic rights; 
the promotion of equality of gender, ethnic groups and religion; the promotion of the rights of children and persons 
with disability; the promotion of conflict resolution and the promotion of the efficiency of justice and law 
enforcement services (Article 14:2 & 5).  
Creating a dichotomy between human rights and development is very difficult because: a) the right to 
development itself is a human right, and b) development activities will directly or indirectly contribute to the 
implementation of human rights, especially socio-economic rights. Likewise, development and conflict resolution 
are closely interlinked, as conflict is one of the causes for underdevelopment, and development activities often 
contribute to conflict resolution and lasting peace. Hence, it is difficult if not impossible to draw a clear line of 
demarcation between those activities that CSOs are permitted to undertake, and those which are off limits to them 
under the law. 
Although the basis of this distinction remains unclear, the message is unequivocal: CSOs interested in service 
delivery and development can receive up to 90% of their funds from foreign sources but the money should be used 
only for service delivery and development, not for rights issues. Critics contend that these restrictions make the 
CSO law inconsistent with international standards related to freedom of association and human rights. The 
argument is that CSOs should not be barred from engagement in rights issues because of their income and all CSOs 
should be allowed to promote the international standards to which the Ethiopian Government is committed. Further, 
the proclamation seems to violate Article 31 of FDRE constitution which gives citizens the right to association. 
Some Ethiopian resident charities or societies have been wisely and innovatively promoting (without 
advertising) governance and rights issues in such thematic areas as gender empowerment, rights of children and 
environmental protection. The recent forced closure of certain CSOs for exceeding their operational mandates 
reveals the risks involved in promoting a rights-based approach without a proper mandate. 
 
c) Foreign Charities 
Foreign charities are those charities that are formed under the laws of foreign countries or which consist of 
members who are foreign nationals or are controlled by foreign nationals or receive funds from foreign sources 
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(Article 2:4). There is no limit on the amount of funds that foreign charities are allowed to bring into the country. 
However, the restrictions that apply to the Ethiopian resident charities and societies apply to foreign charities as 
well and for the same reason. 
Another important point that worth attention here is the 70:30 guideline (guideline on administrative and 
operational costs). The guideline requires CSOs to allocate 70% of their budget for programme activities and 30% 
for administrative purposes. The logic behind the law stems from the pre Proclamation allegations that CSOs spent 
60% of their budget on administrative matters and that their highly paid leaders allegedly advanced the interests 
of foreign agencies rather than the citizens (Dupuy et al., 2015; EPRDF, 2006 in Debebe, 2010; Yalemzewd et al., 
2009). Many local authorities and ordinary beneficiaries of CSOs’ projects reportedly witnessed noticeable 
improvements in accountability, transparency and the flow of resources after the enactment of the proclamation. 
The 70:30 guideline has been challenged on legitimate grounds. The argument is not that the 30% is unfair 
but that the items classified as administrative costs undermines the quality of CSOs activities. The classification 
of transportation, training, research and monitoring and evaluation expenses as administrative costs (rather than 
operational costs) is considered mistaken and counter-productive (Long and Regassa, 2013; Kassahun, 2013). It 
is mistaken because these costs are part of the core activities of most projects and counter-productive in that CSOs 
loose the motivation to launch projects in remote areas, undertake baseline studies, provide training and engage in 
serious monitoring and evaluation. 
The guideline is also viewed as discriminatory in that it rewards financially strong CSOs. Organizations with 
very large budgets do not necessarily have the largest work forces, pay the highest salaries or spend proportionately 
more on research and training than smaller organizations. Indeed, they may not need to spend 30% of their budget 
on running costs. This is not the case for the resource-poor CSOs that may be required to exceed the 30% threshold. 
The proponents of this view call for the amendment of the provision to address the concerns of small CSOs.  
The proclamation recognizes the rights of charities and societies to establish consortia to coordinate their 
activities. The directive issued to regulate the establishment of consortia recognizes the role that networks play: 
building the capacity of their members, voicing common challenges, facilitating experience and information 
sharing and enhancing the ethical and professional standards of their members. However, the 70:30 guideline 
considers all expenses incurred by a consortium as administrative costs stating that networks are not implementers 
and therefore they do not incur operational costs (Debebe, 2011). Thus, the consortia are expected to transfer a 
minimum of 70% of their funds from donors to member CSOs effectively reducing their role to that of fundraiser. 
Consortia are expected to derive their income from membership fees and a percentage share of the 30% 
administrative costs of CSOs and this makes it difficult for them to carry out broader functions. 
As a response to the advocacy efforts exerted by different donors and CSOs to improve the regulatory 
framework, the CSA made some amendments to the 70:30 guideline. The changes apply to the salary and transport 
expenses of CSOs working on HIV, persons with disabilities, agriculture, access to clean water, environmental 
protection, capacity building, training and construction. Hence, the amendment does not apply to all the CSOs and 
does not address the concerns of small CSOs. Also, the request to reclassify research, monitoring and evaluation 
expenses as operational costs remains unaddressed. On a positive note, however, the government’s responsiveness 
to the advocacy efforts deserves to be viewed as a step in the right direction.  
Another limitation of the Proclamation relates to the composition and functioning of the CSA, which it 
establishes to ‘ensure that CSOs operate legally and in accountable and transparent manners’ (Articles 5-6). It is 
constituted of the Charities and Societies Board, a Director General and supporting staff (Article 7). The 
government appoints the seven members of the Board, of which two are nominated from CSOs, as well as the 
Director General, and the Agency is accountable to the Ministry of Justice (Articles 4, 7-8). The Board decides by 
majority vote-with four of its members meeting quorum-on any issue arising under the Proclamation and hears 
appeals from the decisions of the Director (Articles 9-10). The decisions of the Board shall be final except for 
Ethiopian CSOs which may take appeal to the Federal High court (Article 104). The limitation of CSOs to the 
nomination of only two members of the Board and the appointment of all members by the executive branch of 
government, to which the whole agency is accountable, raises questions about the representativeness and 
independence of the Board. The fact that the government nominees meet quorum and constitute a majority for any 
decision magnifies the problem relating to the composition of the Board that has extensive powers. It also limits 
civil society participation in decisions concerning themselves. The law further restricts the due process right (of 
appeal to court) of Ethiopian CSOs and foreign charities and their members. 
The proclamation allowed charities and societies to engage in Income Generating Activities (IGAs) (Article 
103). This provision is meant to enable CSOs to mobilize resources from within the country and reduce their heavy 
dependence on foreign funds. However, the provision contains restrictions that make engagement in IGAs rather 
difficult. CSOs wishing to engage in IGAs are expected to work on activities related to their ‘core mission’, secure 
written approval from the Agency, obtain valid business licenses from the relevant government departments and 
maintain separate accounts for their IGAs. It appears that CSOs’ ‘businesses’ are subjected to additional scrutiny 
that does not apply to the private sector. Nevertheless, I personally argue that an IGA is a business activity that 
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must be governed by the trade law, not by charities and societies proclamation (CSP). Moreover, there should not 
be confusion between business and charity activities that would distort the market and put private businesses at a 
competitive disadvantage.  
The provision that IGAs must be directly related to the ‘core missions’ of the CSO (Article 103:1) is 
particularly difficult for Ethiopian charities and societies. The logic behind this provision is enabling CSOs to 
promote their areas of interest and address business development gaps in those areas while avoiding overcrowding 
and market distortion in certain business areas and discouraging the establishment of CSOs with business as their 
primary interest. However, the logic works only for some CSOs. Organizations that are engaged in service delivery 
can easily identify IGAs (e.g., opening schools, clinics, bookstores, pharmacies, etc.) directly to their missions. In 
this regard, CSOs that receive 90% of their funds from foreign sources are in an advantageous position. The 
challenge is for Ethiopian registered CSOs working on rights issues and receiving only 10% of their funds from 
external sources. They find it difficult to identify business activities leading to marketable products and services 
that are directly related to their missions.  
 
6. Some Impacts of the Proclamation 
The Charities and Societies Proclamation had a dramatic impact on human rights and governance works in Ethiopia. 
The circle of active and professional human rights organizations was already small before the laws were passed. 
These groups, which were mostly established during the 1990s, provided legal aid and civic education, monitored 
elections and human rights violations, and advocated for the rights of minorities, women, and other vulnerable 
groups. 
Following the promulgation of CSP, civil societies working on human rights and democracy have decreased 
in number, many have changed their mandate and those human rights organizations who survived have 
significantly scaled down their activities due to the major impacts of fund restriction (Amnesty International, 2012). 
While community-based giving is common across Ethiopia, there is no strong tradition of donating to charitable 
organizations. Thus, organizations have struggled to raise money through membership fees and fund-raising events. 
Consequently, only around 10 percent of the 125 previously existing local rights groups were re-registered under 
the new proclamation (CSA, 2018). Further, the provision that prohibits anonymous donations had also negatively 
impacted CSOs since capable citizens refrained from donating in the fear of potential political repercussions.    
For some CSOs funding problems translate into capacity deficit in terms of human resources. After the 
enactment of the law, rights organizations were obliged to scale-down their personnel. Most small and resource-
poor CSOs lacked qualified and experienced staffs to help with the mobilization of funds. The lack of experienced 
staff also affects the quality of planning, project implementation, monitoring and evaluation and the timely 
reporting on projects.  
The CSP forced prominent human rights groups to abandon their core missions and to scale back operations 
significantly. Ethiopia’s leading human rights NGO, Ethiopian Human Rights Council (EHRCO, now HRCO), 
had to close 9 of its 12 regional offices and cut 85 percent of its staff. The Ethiopian Women Lawyers’ Association 
(EWLA) cut nearly 70 percent of its staff. In December 2009, the CSA, the regulatory body created under the CSP, 
ordered the freezing of these two groups’ bank accounts, claiming that the money had been received in violation 
of the ban on foreign funding-effectively a retroactive application of the law. HRCO and EWLA’s appeals to the 
courts were not successful (Addis Standard, 2012). Human Right Council (HRCO) had previously conducted 
human rights education seminars and workshops that aimed to raise awareness of human rights standards among 
public servants, police officers, and judicial officials. Despite initial skepticism, participation in these workshops 
was on the rise before the passage of the CSP, a total of 1,034 officials took part (HRCO, 2011). After the law was 
passed, the organization’s budget shrank from $351,000 in 2008 to $26,300 in 2011, forcing it to disband the 
program (Ibid).  
In June 2016, the Charities and Societies Agency, announced that it had shut down more than 200 CSOs in 
the last nine months. The agency cited failure to comply with numerous requirements of the CSP and lack of 
funding as reasons for the closures. The announcement followed the agency issuing a directive that seeks to impose 
penalties for noncompliance with the CSP. By issuing this directive, the agency effectively gave itself quasi-
judicial powers in criminal proceedings (Freedom House, 2016). 
Moreover, CSP, especially its 70/30 guideline is forcing different organizations to move to other countries 
with more hospitable rules, like Kenya. The guideline is reported to have discouraged CSOs from employing and 
retaining qualified staff, launching projects in remote locations, giving capacity building training, undertaking 
serious monitoring and evaluation activities, and sharing information (Kassahun, 2013; Long and Regassa, 2013; 
Debebe, 2011). Hence, the law has resulted in various negative impacts, to mention a few: loss of job opportunities 
which were created due to the existence of these organizations (when the organizations move they take the 
opportunities they provide with them) and the indirect effect on employment creation via capacity building and 
training. It discourages different organizations from coming to the country, this negatively impact the potential 
opportunities (foreign currency source, and employment opportunities, etc.).  
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7. Conclusion and Policy Options   
In nutshell, CSP was intended to boost transparency and accountability and thereby to create strong civil societies. 
Yet, the proclamation has many negative as well as positive impacts. With regard to positive aspects of the law, at 
least it put in place a legal framework that can govern operation of the civil society sector in the country. It also 
provided for the involvement of CSOs in income generation activities. Further, it somehow acknowledges the 
importance of the charitable organizations to the development of the country.  
Yet, the analysis reveals that the law is inconsistent in its detailed regulation with the objective and purpose 
enshrined in its preamble. Likewise, the government strongly mistrusts civil societies and so do the CSOs as well. 
Hence, the relationship on ground between government and CSO via the CSP is not to the level expected. It is rife 
with mistrust and bad-faith. The proclamation is less systematized and over regulative. The classification of CSOs 
based on the income source and the funding requirement thereof is least agreeable to the actors and stakeholders 
of the CSOs. As such, many CSOs have been closed since the implementation of the new law. Again, many CSOs 
with strong intervention capacity are shunned off by the law from engaging on activities that foster democracy and 
human rights thereby contributing to good governance and accountability which in turn creates employment 
opportunity arising out of public accountability.  
The review also undisputedly stipulates that the proclamation incapacitated organizations working on 
promotion of human right, democracy and good governance through funding restrictions. Given the state of the 
economy of the country and infant level of voluntarism, domestic resource mobilization is unrealistic in the current 
Ethiopian context at least in short-term. Thus, as a policy option, the government should better amend the 
restrictive provisions of the CSP and subsequent directives, particularly those restricting foreign funding for human 
right works and imposing the 30 percent cap on administrative expenses. However, the long-term strategy should 
be to encourage domestic resource generation and mobilization and to reduce heavy dependence on foreign donors. 
It’s equally important to strengthen CSOs through financial and technical support so as to increase their role in the 
democratization process of the country.   
On the other hand, CSOs are also advised to strongly lobby and increase domestic funding rather than hinging 
and totally depending on foreign sources. It is critical that both government and CSO engage in continuous debate 
and discussion towards ironing out differences and building common grounds for development. Finally, the 
government and CSs should work hand in hand and assist each other. The government should support CSs and 
their search for fund; it should not put restraints to limit their work and reach. 
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